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to Address Human Needs
Michael A. Dover1®
Abstract
This article presents an original needs-based partial theory of human injustice and 
shows its relationship to existing theories of human need and human liberation. The 
theory is based on an original typology of three social structural sources of human 
injustice, a partial theorization of the mechanisms of human injustice, and a needs- 
based theorization of the nature of human injustice, as experienced by individuals. 
This article makes a sociological contribution to normative social theory by clar­
ifying the relationship of human injustice to human needs, human rights, and human 
liberation. The theory contends that human injustice is produced when oppres­
sion, mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation create systematic inequality in 
opportunities to address human needs, leading to wrongful need deprivation and 
the resulting serious harm. In one longer sentence, this needs-based theory of the 
sources, mechanisms, and nature of human injustice contends that three distinct 
social systemic sources—oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and exploita­
tion—produce unique and/or overlapping social mechanisms, which create
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systematic inequality in opportunities to address universal human needs in cultu­
rally specific ways, thus producing the nature of the human injustice theorized 
here: wrongfully unmet needs and serious harm.
Keywords
oppression, dehumanization, human injustice, human needs, social justice, human 
liberation
Personal Reflexive Statement
I have devoted my life to understanding and changing the world around me, while 
trying to be of some help along the way. I have done this as a social activist since 
entering the University of Michigan in 1966; as a social worker since earning two 
degrees in New York City in the 1970s; as a sociologist since entering Michigan's 
doctoral program in social work and sociology in 1991; and as a social work 
educator since 2003. For changing the world, my primary activism has involved 
alternative journalism; Chile solidarity; peace and nuclear disarmament; radicals 
in the professions work; consistent membership on the organized left; trade union­
ism (work for five union-based programs, organizing a social agency, and election 
to two faculty union positions); and work on affirmative action, police/community 
relations and campus/community bias incidents. For understanding the world, other 
than my dissertation on the social system of real property, I have worked since 1991 
in two areas: theories of oppression, dehumanization, and exploitation and theories 
of human need. This needs-based theory of human injustice integrates these two 
areas of previous work and seeks to improve my ability to theorize about, engage 
with, and change the world around me.
Introduction
This article presents a needs-based partial theory of human justice, focused on three 
levels of analysis. First, at the macro social system level, I have created a typology of 
three systemic sources of human injustice: oppression, exploitation, and mechanistic 
dehumanization. Second, at the level of social mechanisms, I supply a partial the­
orization of how these three unjust social systems produce systematic inequality in 
the opportunities people and communities must have to obtain culturally specific 
satisfiers of universal human needs. Third, at the individual level, I provide a needs- 
based theorization of the nature of human injustice as individually experienced, with 
a focus on wrongfully unmet needs and how they can lead to serious harm.
To state the theory in one sentence: This needs-based theory of the systemic 
sources, social mechanisms, and nature of human injustice contends that three 
distinct social systemic sources—oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and
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exploitation—produce unique and/or overlapping social mechanisms which create 
systematic inequality in opportunities to address universal human needs in culturally 
specific ways, leading to the nature of the human injustice theorized here: wrong­
fully unmet needs and the resulting serious harm.
Levels of Analysis and Preliminary Definitions
Starting at the level of analysis of social systemic sources of human injustice, 
oppression in its many forms is conceptualized as a social group-based phenomenon 
that is distinct from exploitation (Cudd 2006). I define exploitation in a way that is 
applicable across economic systems, with the commonality being unequal advan­
tages exercised within the context of structured economic exchanges. For instance, 
Hahnel (2006) contended that unjust outcomes are produced by transactions between 
parties who have unequal access to capital, which for the present purposes is broadly 
conceived to consider a wide variety of forms of capital, such as finance capital, 
social capital, cultural capital, and so forth.
At a similar social structural level of analysis, the third social systemic source 
of human injustice is mechanistic dehumanization (Bauman 2000; Haslam 2013; 
Kronfeldner 2016; Ritzer 2019). The typology presented in the third section of this 
article sees mechanistic dehumanization as conceptually distinct from oppression 
and exploitation. Mechanistic dehumanization is the systemic subjection of human 
beings to standardized impersonal processes that ignore our fundamentally human 
characteristics and treat us as nonhuman and/or nonliving objects of manipulation 
and control (Haslam 2006). Mechanistic dehumanization involves a range of spe­
cific mechanisms, such as objectification, desensitization, denial of our need to 
connect with the natural environment, and so forth. It also involves other aspects 
of the dehumanizing consequences of the human creation of Weber's shell as hard as 
steel—a new translation of the iron cage (Baehr 2001; Merton 1936; Weber, Baehr, 
and Wells 2002)—and of what Marx (1981) referred to as “the objective transfor­
mation of the activity of man and of its results into an independent force, dominating 
him and inimical to him” (p. 176).
Moving to the level of analysis of social mechanisms, unique and overlapping 
social mechanisms associated with each of the three unjust social mechanisms 
produce systematic inequality in the opportunities people and communities must 
have to access culturally specific need satisfiers of universal human needs. These 
include satisfiers of the intermediate needs discussed in the literature review 
below—from food and water to significant primary relationships and safe birth 
control and childbearing—that human beings must have access to if we are to meet 
our basic human needs for health and autonomy and our basic psychological needs 
for autonomy, relatedness, and competence.
These universal needs are spelled out by two well-established and compatible 
theories: a philosophically constructed theory of human need (THN; Doyal and 
Gough 1991; Gough 2017) and a post-Maslowian humanistic psychological
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Figure 1. Theories of human injustice, human need, and human liberation.
theory: self-determination theory (SDT; Deci and Ryan 1980; Ryan and Deci 
2017). Figure 1 illustrates the compatibility of these two theories, which this article 
refers to as THN and SDT. Such abbreviations are commonly adopted (Deci and 
Ryan 2000; Dover 2016b; Gough 2015).
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Human universal goals of social participation, eudaimonic well-being, and avoid­
ance of serious harm cannot be realized without achieving an optimum level of 
human and psychological need satisfaction. Accordingly, at the individual level, I 
define the nature of human injustice as a state of wrongfully unmet human needs. 
Absent social or individual intervention, this produces significantly impaired social 
participation and serious harm.
Presentation as a Partial Theory
By design, this is a partial theory. I focus only on human injustice as defined here, 
not on social injustice more broadly. For example, I do not include individual fail­
ures to prevent injustice (Shklar 1990). This partial theory cannot specify the myriad 
unique and/or simultaneously operating social submechanisms which are part and 
parcel of the central mechanism outlined in the theory sentence, namely systematic 
inequality in opportunities to address universal human needs in culturally specific 
ways. Also, some components of the theory are based upon stated assumptions 
stemming from existing theories of human need. McCarthy and Zald (1977) referred 
to their work on resource mobilization as a partial theory for similar reasons. Like- 
wise, Maslow (1948) referred to the theory of human motivation as a partial theory. 
This should not hold back the process of theory construction. After all, Hedstrom 
and Swedberg (1998) suggested the value of a preliminary account of how relevant 
social mechanisms work.
Organization of This Article
This paper has several sections: (1) this introduction; (2) a literature review, which 
outlines the current nature of theories of human need and their relevance for sociol­
ogy, including an explanation of Figure 1, columns 2 and 3 on human need and 
human liberation, respectively; (3) presentation of a typology of exploitation, 
oppression, and mechanistic dehumanization; (4) explanation of each component 
of the above theory sentence, preceded by an explanation of column 1 of Figure 1 on 
human injustice; and (5) conclusions regarding implications of this theory for social 
theory, social research, and social activism.
Relevance to Humanistic Sociology
The specific type of normative social theory to which this article contributes is 
needs-based social theory (Brock 2009; Floyd 2011; Noonan 2006; Reader 2006, 
2011; Reader and Brock 2004). Others have contended that a theory of social justice 
requires a concept of human need (Brock 1996; Wiggins 1998). I use such a needs- 
based approach to present a three-part continuum from human injustice, to basic 
human need satisfaction to human liberation.
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This three-element discursive alternative to the more abstract distinction between 
social injustice and social justice is amenable to empirical research, since the degree 
of human need satisfaction is an objective and observable aspect of the human
condition. This theory and continuum can contribute to a post-Cold War moral 
system that addresses human need, human vulnerability, and human interdepen- 
dence (Friesen 2014). Such a system should enforce human rights and make sustain- 
able human need satisfaction our global social justice goal (Brock 2011, 2018; 
Friesen 2014; Gough 2017; Miller 2012b).
True, theory alone will not do the trick, without popular struggles, social move­
ment building and the challenging of basic cultural—and, I would contend, theore­
tical—precepts (Dolgon 2018). If a new post-Cold War social contract is to be 
achieved, we must theorize and struggle on behalf of human needs and the needs 
of all sentient beings in the Anthropocene (Gabardi 2017). We must engage in 
theoretical and social criticism of abnormal and unnecessary social suffering 
(Renault 2017). I present this theory in that spirit and from the below standpoint.
Author's Standpoint
This work grew out of two separate lines of inquiry over the last 25 years. At the 
macro level, one concerned THN and its implications for social theory and social 
policy. At the micro level, the other began with classroom exercises about the 
experience of the moment of oppression.
With respect to theories of human need, in the debates among progressive acti­
vists after the fall of what Kennedy (1991) called communist-governed forms of 
state socialism, I opposed taking a defeatist position towards addressing human 
needs (Dover 1992, Dover 1993a). I published a book review (Dover 1993b) of 
Doyal and Gough's (1991) A Theory of Human Need. That book won the Deutscher 
Memorial Prize and the Gunnar Myrdal Prize in 1992. I advocated for the first-time 
inclusion of the concept of human need in the social work Code of Ethics (National 
Association of Social Workers 1996). I contended that “knowledge of theories of 
human need and social justice” be required for social work education's accreditation 
standards (Council on Social Work Education 2015). I also contributed to the first 
two entries on human need in the Encyclopedia of Social Work (Dover 2016b; Dover 
and Joseph 2008). I later applied theory of need to a public sociology that called for a 
needs-based progressive pragmatist approach to key social policy issues such as 
school funding and youth unemployment (Dover 2014, 2017).
The second line of inquiry began with classroom oppression-awareness exercises 
at several universities, beginning in 1990. This led to the publication of a compen­
dium of words and affective phrases describing the feelings and emotions experi­
enced at the moment of acts of oppression, dehumanization, and exploitation (Dover 
2008). That typology was strengthened by the study of organizational, institutional, 
and class analysis, for a preliminary examination in sociology (Dover 1996).
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Formal theory construction began when I realized the relationship of the two lines 
of work. This took place following conference presentations on both topics (Dover 
2009a, 2009b, 2009c) and completion of a retrospective analysis of the craft of 
theorizing used in my dissertation (Dover 2003, 2010b).
Craft of Theorizing Used
Swedberg's (2010, 2012, 2014a, 2014b) work on the craft of theorizing influenced 
theory construction. First, I asked what Kimeldorf (1998) referred to as an originat­
ing question: “What are the social structural causes of social injustice? ” I then posed 
what Kimeldorf called a specifying question: “Is it possible that oppression, mechan- 
istic dehumanization and exploitation are the three sources of social injustice? ” This 
was followed by what Tilly (1990) referred to as subsidiary questions, for example: 
How are these three social systems related to each other? Is there a fourth such 
system? How might their social mechanisms produce unmet need? What is the 
nature of wrongfully unmet need? The present theory responds to such questions.
As part of the craft of theorizing, I used class theory, defined as theory developed 
in the classroom. This included guessing—in class—the second and third elements 
of the typology of unjust social systems: exploitation and dehumanization. First, a 
student in our oppression exercise said they had never experienced oppression and, 
therefore, could not take part in the exercise. I asked, have you ever had a lousy 
minimum wage job? The student said yes and was able to talk about unjust moments 
from that experience of exploitation. After a couple of years, a student contended 
that they never been oppressed or exploited. I asked: has a bureaucracy ever treated 
you like a number? The student answered yes and gave an example. Ensuing dis­
cussion added dehumanization to the typology of systems that can produce powerful 
moments of the experience of injustice. The nature of the exercise and the resulting 
compendium were later published (Dover 2008). At this example shows, guessing 
and class discussion are part of the craft of theorizing (Peirce 1929, cited in Swed- 
berg [2014a]).
Other craft elements employed included reducing the theory to one sentence, 
parsing the sentence into its component parts, presenting the theory via explanation 
of each of the parts of that sentence, and—after returning from the aforementioned 
conference at the University of Bath in 2009—waking up one morning having 
dreamed column 1 of Figure 1. According to Swedberg (2014a), dreams can help 
fuel the sociological imagination which is exercised in the craft of theorizing.
Literature Review: Human Need and Humanistic Sociology
This section discusses the importance of theories of human need, discusses some of 
their key conceptual problems, presents a synthesis of the key concepts of THN and 
SDT, and explains columns 2 and 3 of Figure 1.
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Importance of Theory of Human Need for Humanistic Sociology
Despite considerable sociological attention to human rights in recent years (Cole 
2012; Sklair 2009; Somers and Roberts 2008), Wolbring, Keuschnigg, and Negele 
(2013) pointed out there has been little formal theoretical attention to human need in 
sociology. This is despite Sayer's (1997, 2011) recognition that an objectivist foun- 
dation to human well-being is implicit in classical and recent social theory.
Early on, Lynd (1939) stressed the importance of asking questions that have 
“relevance to persisting human need” (p. 226). Etzioni (1968) contended that 
improvements in human needs theory might correct for Wrong's (1961) concern 
about oversocialized conceptions of humankind. Lenski (2005) suggested moving 
beyond Maslow to develop modern theories of human similarities and differences. 
Estes (2008) contended that human needs are objective, universal, and transcultural, 
and endorsed Doyal and Gough's (1991) theory of human need.
More recently, Friesen (2014) suggested that societal moral systems, codified as 
human rights, are an example of the conceptual evolution of humanity. Friesen 
(2014: 21) further proposed to “move the dialogue from a descriptive analysis of 
what a society is to what it should be” and to develop “a theory of society based on 
democratic human need fulfillment. ” Furthermore, Sayer (2007: 241) called for a 
“needs-based conception of social being, ” which recognizes that people are 
“... capable of flourishing or suffering. ”
However, despite explicit calls for humanistic sociology to attend to questions of 
human need (DuBois and Wright 2002, Goodwin 2003, Parsons 1971), no previous 
article in this journal has utilized formal theories of human need nor presented a 
needs-based theory of injustice. With one notable exception (House and Mortimer 
1990), the sociological literature has not responded to Etzioni's (1996) emphasis on 
the contradiction between social structures which produce false needs and the role of 
human autonomy in addressing true needs.
This has been the case for several reasons. First, McCarthyism had a deleterious 
influence on American intellectual life (Dover 2016b). For example, during the 
McCarthy period, the plates of the book Common Human Needs were destroyed 
by the federal government, following Congressional criticism of its prescriptions for 
human well-being (Posner 1995; Towle 1944, 1945). Second, Gough (2017: 39-41) 
stressed the role of four competing theories: preference satisfaction theory, happi­
ness and subjective well-being theory, relational well-being theory and its roots in 
cultural relativism, and the human capabilities approach. Third, what McCumber 
(2016) called the triumph of Cold War philosophy deemphasized normative con- 
cerns and stressed positivist epistemology. In other words (Antonio 1981: 331), 
“Western social science, based on the Kantian division of fact and value, is supposed 
to describe ‘what is' without making value judgements. ”
Fourth, Cold War ideological conflict stunted full recognition of the centrality of 
human needs and human rights. By the 1970s, Moyn (2018) has noted, Cold War 
assumptions had undermined the 1940s era recognition that civil and political rights
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were fundamentally linked with economic and social rights. As the end of the Cold 
War approached, Moyn (2018: 212) saw an increased “visibility of human rights 
ideals, ” accompanied by a declining emphasis on national social welfare commit­
ments. Seen retrospectively, many of the civil rights and social welfare policy 
advances during the Cold War were achieved due both to mass mobilizations and 
to corporate liberal elite consent motivated by the value of such policies in the Cold 
War ideological struggle (Dover 1998; Dudziak 2000). Following the Cold War, the 
earlier reliance on advocacy for human rights as a “morally pure form of activism” 
(Moyn 2018: 212) became ascendant.
This led to the widespread post-Cold War use of human rights discourse to 
advance social justice causes, but also to a reduction in the extent of explicit human 
needs advocacy, which Moyn (2018) noted had been widely employed as part ofthe 
basic needs approach to social development in the 1970s. Following the Cold War, 
postmodernist and poststructuralist thinking recognized that human needs might be 
universal from a theoretical standpoint, but also contended they were ultimately 
“historical, normative, and political in nature” (Hamilton 2013: 56). Human rights 
were increasingly seen as universal, while human needs were seen as socially con­
structed, culturally relative, and rooted in Eurocentric master narratives (Ife 2001, 
2007; Jani and Reisch 2011).
This was despite some recognition that the opposite is true: Human rights are 
universal only to the extent that they are adopted and enforced, but human needs are 
rooted in the human condition. For instance, Wronka (2017: Preface) recognized: 
“Technically, human rights do not exist. However, human needs do, and human 
rights make up the legal mandate to fulfill human need. ” Optimally, human needs, 
human rights, and social justice should be discussed with reference to each other, 
rather than singly. A typology of human injustice, human need, and human liberation 
can inform a needs-based approach to such a discourse.
There is now promise for sociology to return its attention to normative social 
science (Gorski 2016; Prasad 2016; Steward 2016) and to evolve a critical social 
science which would “explicitly and systematically analyze and critique the rela­
tionship between normative and descriptive claims” (Gorski 2017: 442). Social 
scientists have recently been encouraged to listen to our “cousins in moral and 
political philosophy” (Gorski 2013: 553). Sayer (2009: 782) said that normative 
approaches should include “... some conception of well-being and ill-being. ”
Such theory can address fundamental sociological concerns. For instance, take 
the question of inequality or social stratification. Dean and Platt (2016: 343) pointed 
out that Sen (1992) asked an important question: Inequality of what? Sen's focus and 
that of Nussbaum (2011) have been on inequality of capabilities. I stress inequality 
of opportunities to address needs. The advantages of needs theory are shown in a 
chapter which favorably compared needs theory to capabilities theory (Gough 
2014), published in a book edited by Comim and Nussbaum (2014).
Likewise, Rawls (1971: 36) asked an important question about social structure: 
What does a just social structure look like? Finally, Renault (2017: 175) asked, “But
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what kind of standard can we appeal to when we demand that social suffering be one 
of the topics of public discussion and political confrontation? ” The present article 
suggests three related questions: (1) What does an unjust structure of society look 
like? The typology of oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation 
includes three necessary but not sufficient conditions for human injustice. (2) What 
does a partial account of its social mechanisms suggest? This article suggests that the 
overriding social mechanism is the creation of systematic inequality of opportunities 
to access need satisfiers. (3) How can we conceptualize the nature of the human 
injustice produced? This article suggests that wrongfully unmet needs, if not 
addressed, produce serious harm and significantly impaired social participation.
Theories of Human Need: Literature Reviews
First, I will briefly discuss several overviews of needs theory. Dean (2010) dis­
cussed theories of need within the context of social policy and social theory. Dean 
analyzed Marx's account of human need, as have others at book length (Fraser 
1998; Heller 1976; Soper 1981; Springborg 1981). Dean also distinguished 
between humanistic, economistic, paternalistic, and moralistic accounts of needs 
and stressed the centrality of needs concepts for understanding forms of social 
exclusion. The present article stresses inequality of opportunities to address needs 
as an example of social exclusion.
A recent volume on sustainable social development (Holden, Linnerud, and 
Banister 2018) included accounts of the capability theory of Sen (2009) and Nuss- 
baum (2000), Max-Neef's (1992) account of human scale development, Rawl's 
(1999) concept of primary goods, and Maslow's (1943) hierarchy of needs. The 
authors compared the theories of Doyal and Gough and of Max-Neef and showed 
they both viewed human needs as universal and objective, although satisfied in 
culturally specific manners. Like Gough (2017), both theories stress the impor­
tance of need theory in planning for the sustainability of human need satisfaction 
for future generations.
Brock (2018: 1) began by noting the many ways of “interpreting the advice to 
distribute ‘to each according to his needs. '” Brock's reference is of course to the 
phrase “from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs” 
(Marx 1978: 531). Brock reviewed classical and modern philosophical treatment 
of the concept of human need. For instance, Brock (2018: 14) described the 
contention of Frankfurt (1998) that there are “two necessary conditions for a 
need's deserving moral importance: a need is morally important if harm typi­
cally results when the need is not met and that harm is outside the person's 
voluntary control. ” Brock also explained the view of Wiggins ([1987] 1998) 
regarding the moral importance of the serious harm which can arise when 
factors beyond a person's control prevent vital needs that are entrenched— 
inflexible and not substitutable—from being met.
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Brock (2018: 15) pointed out that Doyal and Gough (1991) theorized human need 
satisfaction as requiring “universalizable preconditions that enable non-impaired 
participation... ” Earlier, Brock's (2009) Global Justice: A Cosmopolitican Account 
pointed out that Doyal and Gough stressed the importance of social (not just phys- 
ical) functioning, as well as the value of cross-cultural comparison of how people 
function individually and in social groups to address their morally important needs.
A book-length summary of SDT and related research is now available (Ryan and 
Deci 2017), as is a chapter-length explanation of THN, in a monograph applying 
needs theory to global climate change (Gough 2017). The present author has also 
published two annotated bibliographies (Dover 2010a, 2016a) and two encyclopedic 
overviews of human need theory (Dover and Joseph 2008; Dover 2016b).
Theories of Human Need: Conceptual Issues
Nevertheless, there have been a number of conceptual problems that should be 
discussed here (Laudan 1977; Tucker 1994). The first concerns the importance of 
distinguishing between needs and wants. This distinction was addressed in the first 
presentation of THN (Doyal and Gough 1984, 1986). In the Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, Gough (2015) later showed that the emphasis of economic theory on 
wants (preferences) over needs has produced social policies that neither advance 
human well-being nor address how climate change threatens basic need satisfaction 
for future generations. Other reasons for distinguishing between needs and wants 
have also been discussed (Frankfurt 1998; Gasper 2004; Gough and Thomas 1994; 
Macpherson 1977; Miller 2012a; Noonan 2006).
Another conceptual problem is whether to confine contemporary needs theory to 
theories of basic survival needs. Theories of human need have been concerned with the 
thin needs associated with basic need satisfaction and the thick needs associated with 
human flourishing (Dean 2010, Dean 2013, Fraser 1989b, Taylor 2011. As recently 
noted (Noonan 2014), the concept of human need can be used for a contemporary 
critique of capitalism and for understanding the requirements of human flourishing.
Also, how should we understand the question of serious harm? Lack of access to 
needs satisfiers, unless addressed by social interventions, will produce serious harm 
(Provence and Lipton 1963; Waldfogel 2006). Rawl's (1971) original position, 
which proposed a veil of ignorance about the nature of the rights required for the 
avoidance of harm, was used by Doyal and Gough (1991) to theorize the nature of 
basic human needs. Wiggins ([1987] 1998) concluded that it is possible to identify 
objective, noncircumstantial conditions which are necessary in order to avoid seri- 
ous harm. Miller (2012b) discussed Doyal and Gough's (1991) use of the centrality 
of serious harm and indicated their approaches were not contrary to a more devel- 
oped account of serious harm. However, not all serious harm is a result of human 
injustice. As Mikkola (2016: 151) noted: “Not all harms that we suffer are wrongs. ” 
This theory only concerns serious harm that is resultant from wrongfully unmet 
needs stemming from the structures and mechanisms of human injustice.
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The most vexing conceptual problem has concerned whether human needs are 
universal or culturally specific. This is not a simple question, but the study of human 
universals is an important question for anthropology and other disciplines (Brown 
1991, 2004). Proponents of human universals may face criticism they are “imposing 
some kind of repressive universalism” (Sayer 2009: 776), or are advocating for a 
dictatorship over needs (Feher, Heller, and Markus 1983). Gough (1994), however, 
convincingly dismissed concern that the proper application of needs theory would 
involve any kind of paternalistic dictatorship over needs, an issue also discussed by 
Reader and Brock (2004).
Both THN and SDT theorize that human needs are universal but addressed in 
culturally specific manners. As for the contention that universal needs can be iden­
tified, Noonan (2012) distinguished between objective organic life requirements and 
more comprehensive conceptualizations of need and made the convincing claim that 
both can be defended as universal. Dean (2010) argued that universal conceptions of 
need are required in order to explain our relational selves and our need to mean­
ingfully participate in human society. Ife (2013) recognized that grassroots discourse 
rooted in the assertion of universal human rights and informed by the universal 
human need theory of Doyal and Gough (1991) can contribute to struggles against 
neoliberal globalization.
Accordingly, a theoretical assumption made by this theory of human injustice 
is—as Doyal and Gough (1991: 28) contended—human needs “are the same now as 
they will be in the future—everywhere and for everyone. ” As Maya Angelou (1994: 
224-225) put it, “I note the obvious differences, between each sort and type, but we 
are more alike, my friends, than we are unalike. We are more alike, my friends, than 
we are unalike. ”
THN and SDT
According to a theory of human need (Doyal and Gough 1991) and to self-determi­
nation theory (Ryan and Deci 2017), the individual human need of all human beings 
is to achieve an optimum level of health and an optimum exercise of autonomy of 
agency. Autonomy, as broadly defined in THN, requires satisfying the psychological 
needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness theorized by SDT. Minimally 
optimal satisfaction of health and autonomy needs (THN) and satisfied basic psy- 
chological needs (SDT) are necessary to (1) achieve an implicit universal goal of 
survival and avoidance of serious harm and (2) achieve explicit universal goals of 
engaging in minimally impaired social participation (THN) and eudaimonic well- 
being (SDT).
According to these theories, there is no hierarchy between physical and psy­
chological needs. Both are essential for achieving universal human goals related 
to participation and well-being. However, human liberation demands other soci­
etal preconditions such as enhanced levels of critical autonomy and self­
determined behavior.
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Figure 1 illustrates the above synthesis of THN and SDT, in columns 2 and 3. Ian 
Gough, coauthor of THN, and Richard Ryan, coauthor of SDT, have confirmed the 
accuracy of the juxtapositions of their theories presented in columns 2 and 3 of 
Figure 1 (private communications, 2016 and 2018). Columns 2 and 3 portray the 
structure of THN in a way that is theoretically identical to earlier work (Doyal and 
Gough 1991: 170, figure 8. 2, used with permission). We will begin with the bottom 
of the chart, at the social system level, and move up to the sociocultural and 
individual-level requirements and characteristics of basic human need satisfaction 
and human liberation.
Figure 1 and the above several paragraphs are the first effort to graphically 
portray and conceptually combine the relationship of THN and SDT. The above 
paragraph draws entirely on earlier formulations of THN and SDT, except for the 
distinction between implicit and explicit goals. Needs theory rests on the implicit 
theoretical assumption that avoidance of serious harm is a universally desirable 
outcome, irrespective of anomalous observations to the contrary, such as those 
mortals who seek to defy the concept of cumulative risk (Laudan 1994, 1997). But 
there are also explicit universal goals related to social participation which are char- 
acteristic of human beings. Both the implicit and explicit aspects of the universaliz- 
able goals defined by THN and SDT are inextricably bound up with each other as 
part of the avoidance of serious harm and the pursuit of human liberation.
In the bottom box of column 2 of Figure 1, at the social system level, THN posits 
four universal societal preconditions for achieving basic needs: systems of produc- 
tion, reproduction, cultural transmission, and political authority. SDT stresses how 
proximal social contexts and pervasive social, economic, and political influences are 
the foundation for the culturally specific mix of satisfiers of basic needs. For SDT, 
these differentiate between need supportive (or less supportive) environments. For 
THN, theoretical and empirical support exists for a variety of specific intermediate 
needs. Optimally, meeting basic human and psychological needs is not possible 
without a minimally optimal level of intermediate need satisfaction.
The bottom of column 3 outlines THN's preconditions for optimization of need 
satisfaction and for human liberation. This includes a set of human rights with some 
mechanism for enforcement. There I have placed the phrase universal human rights 
in parentheses because that term was not in the original THN theory chart. That chart 
referred to a set of negative and positive rights (Doyal and Gough 1991: 170). In a 
minor semantic revision to the original theory, Gough (2017) recently referred to 
negative and positive rights as freedoms from and freedoms to, respectively. These 
include political participation and other political rights, as well as civil rights and a 
guarantee of the right to needs satisfiers.
Theoretically, these rights outlined in column 3 are preconditions for human 
liberation. As outlined in column 2, a more limited set of universal preconditions 
allow meeting basic human needs. The present theory builds on columns 2 and 3 by 
suggesting that unjust social systems can produce systematic inequality in access to 
satisfiers of intermediate needs. This reinforces the centrality of the human rights
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outlined in column 3, since systems of human rights can constrain contempora­
neously coexisting systems of human injustice.
Notably, according to THN, as we move up from the bottom of column 3, human 
liberation requires cross-cultural education, broadly conceived to mean not only 
formal education but the entire range of what sociologists used to refer to as race 
and culture contacts (Frazier 1957). Clearly, to achieve critical participation in one's 
chosen form of life (human liberation as theorized by THN, see column 1 at top), one 
must have knowledge of alternative ways of life. Additionally, human liberation 
demands a higher level of autonomy—critical autonomy, according to THN—as 
well as enhanced human capacity, such as a higher level of competence, relatedness, 
and autonomy, according to SDT.
A Typology of Three Sources of Human Injustice
Social theory aimed at understanding more than one unjust social system—and what 
it is about each system that contributes to injustice—has a long pedigree. Marx 
([1867] 1967: Vol. 1, 301) famously asserted, “Labour cannot emancipate itself in 
the white skin where in the black it is branded. ” Capitalism and Slavery (Williams 
1944) and Caste, Class, & Race: A Study in Social Dynamics (Cox 1948) discussed 
the respective roles of exploitation and oppression in human slavery. Debate con­
tinues today about the relative roles of two systems—capitalism and racism/racial 
formations—in enforcing social inequality (Bonilla-Silva 2014; Coates 2011; Omi 
and Winant 2015).
Such work begged two important counterfactual questions. First, would ending 
one unjust social system be possible without ending the other? Second, would 
ending one system accelerate the unjust role of the other? Such questions fueled the 
dual systems theory debate (Sargent 1981), which concerned the respective roles of 
class exploitation and oppression—especially patriarchy—in producing injustice 
(Fraser 1989b; Young 1981, 1990, 1997). The present typology differentiates not 
two but three social systemic sources of human injustice: exploitation, oppression, 
and mechanistic dehumanization.
Theoretical Assumptions
This typology agrees that the sources of injustice are neither unitary nor fully 
mutually exclusive in operation (Collins 2015; Collins and Bilge 2016). However, 
at the social system level of analysis, this theory sees them as conceptually distinct 
sources of human injustice. At the level of analysis of social mechanisms, this theory 
sees them as working in various combinations and instances, both jointly and singly, 
to produce systematic inequality.
I have theorized human injustice at three levels, using the same concept: human 
injustice. It is not tautological to define the nature of human injustice as a product of 
the sources and mechanisms of human injustice. This is because the causal path from
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unjust social structures to wrongfully unmet individual needs involves distinct levels 
ofanalysis. This is a theory o f human injustice at the individual level and of its social 
structural sources.
This typology also makes assumptions about relevant change agent questions. For 
instance, who, in any society, is at the helm of the systems of production, reproduc­
tion, cultural transmission, and political authority theorized by THN to be universal 
preconditions? Who sets up and enforces the systems of human rights needed for 
human liberation? Who controls systems of oppression, mechanistic dehumaniza- 
tion, and exploitation? Such moments of the agential exercise of power represent an 
undetermined combination of heteronomy and autonomy: They are both constrained 
and self-determined.
At this stage of theory articulation, this partial theory cannot narrate such 
moments of the exercise of power or name specific human agents. However, con­
sistent with the weakly version of the microfoundations thesis (Little 1991), this can 
conceivably be done with further research. In one step toward this, I discuss further 
below the role of change agents in primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention of 
human injustice.
That theorization of prevention shows this is not a deterministic theory. A deter­
ministic theory posits that given a certain condition, a particular outcome will 
always be observed (Friesen 2014). The present theory sees the three unjust social 
systems as necessary conditions, not as sufficient conditions. Figure 1 illustrates a 
causal path from the societal to the mechanistic to the individual levels of human 
injustice. This theory contends this happens when there are no successful social 
interventions to disrupt that process.
In other words, the theorized causal path does not predetermine a particular 
outcome, at any level. People, communities, and entire societies may exercise their 
autonomy by enforcing human rights at each stage of the production of human 
injustice. In this sense, there are both vertical and horizontal elements of the theory. 
There is tension between unjust social systems in column 1 and the human rights in 
column 3. Universal human rights can laterally influence the extent to which cultu­
rally specific satisfiers of intermediate needs (THN) have enabled creation of a 
needs-supportive environment (SDT).
For instance, please see the arrow from preconditions for optimization at the 
bottom of column 3 to specific satisfiers in column 2 and from box B in column 
1 of Figure 1 to the same specific satisfiers. In other words, within any culturally 
specific historical conjuncture, there are struggles and debates over needs (Fraser 
1989a, 1989b). Such struggles can defend our ability to achieve the minimally 
optimal level of intermediate human need satisfaction shown in column 2, mobilize 
against the human injustice illustrated in column 1, and strive for the human libera­
tion outlined in column 3.
Human injustice, even with the continued existence of systems of oppression, 
mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation, is not inevitable. We are capable of 
undergoing what is known as a moral paradigmatic shift (Friesen 2014), which
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would enable us to influence the nature of the moral system under which we live and 
to defy the seemingly deterministic outcomes of a particular material infrastructure, 
the control of which can be contested. As Reynolds (1963: 186) noted, “oppression 
produces the resistance which will in the end overthrow it. ”
Exploitation
This theory needs a conceptualization of exploitation that is applicable across eco­
nomic systems. This typology draws on the work of Hahnel (2006) and Tilly (1998). 
Like Cudd's (2006) theory of oppression, they are applicable universally across 
different economic systems. Hahnel (2006) contended that exploitation involves 
transactions between unequal parties that produce unjust outcomes. Hahnel noted 
that employment under capitalism leads to alienation and injustice. However, Hah- 
nel also pointed out that in any hypothetical economy characterized by capital and 
labor markets, even free economic exchanges can worsen injustice, given unequal 
advantages to those with a capital advantage. The implication of that theory is that 
exploitation is not necessarily directly coercive.
This dovetails with the observation of Cudd (2006) that exploitation is not inher­
ently coercive. In most historical instances, it may very well have been. But from a 
theoretical perspective, it need not be. Nevertheless, small disadvantages, even in 
free exchanges, are significant. They can become cumulative in their impact (Blau 
and Duncan 1967; W. E. B. DuBois 1973). Hahnel recognized that unjust outcomes 
can take place in any economy where markets in labor, commodities, or credit exist. 
Those with less capital in an economic exchange experience disadvantage, and this 
can lead to unjust outcomes.
Tilly (1998) developed a theory of inequality that posited mechanisms of group 
domination as well as economic extraction. For Tilly, powerful, connected people 
and organizations engage in exploitation by deploying resources from which they 
draw significantly increased returns. They coordinate the efforts of outsiders, whom 
they exclude from the full value added by those efforts. Exploitation involves the 
coordinated efforts of power holders, who deploy and command resources to control 
the returns from those resources, engage in categorical exclusion, and skew the 
distribution of returns in a way not consistent with effort. As with Hahnel's theory, 
Tilly's work helps explain how exploitation can produce systematic inequality 
across economic systems.
Taken together, as applied and adapted here, these two approaches to understand­
ing exploitation enable us to understand exploitation in a way that is conceptually 
distinct from the theories of oppression and mechanistic dehumanization used in this 
typology. Furthermore, this approach to exploitation is applicable across various 
economic systems and historical periods.
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Oppression
In a book-length univocal philosophical theory of oppression, Cudd (2006) 
addressed the risk of reducing all forms of oppression to a single type of oppression. 
Another well-known risk is violating the principle of not constructing hierarchies of 
oppression (Collins 1993). Accordingly, the present theory does not privilege 
oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, or exploitation. Also, this article does not 
try to distinguish among or discuss the various forms of oppression themselves 
(ableism, ageism, heterosexism, racism, sexism, to acknowledge just a few alpha- 
betically). Nor does it imply these three sources of human injustice cannot work 
jointly at the level of specific social mechanisms or social formations. For instance, 
exploitation combined with oppression produces superexploitation (Nielsen and 
Ware 1997; Omi and Winant 1994).
Cudd (2006) cited other theories of oppression (J. Harvey 1999; Wertheimer 1987; 
Young 1990) and discussed theories that directly informed the model (Clatterbaugh 
1996; Frye 1983). These included one that suggested the value of relying on the 
concept of social group as a core element of the theory (Gilbert 1989). Cudd identified 
four necessary and sufficient conditions for social group oppression: (1) a harm 
condition linked to identifiable institutionalized practices, (2) institutionally and per­
petually applied harm to a social group that exists independently of the presence of the 
harm condition, (3) a privilege condition requiring the existence of a social group 
which benefits from the identified institutional practice, and (4) a coercion condition 
involving demonstrated use of coercion as part of the identified harm.
Cudd discussed direct and indirect forms of both material and psychological 
oppression. Cudd devoted an extensive philosophical analysis to determining that 
coercion is not an inherent element of exploitation and workplace participation 
under either capitalism or socialism. On this basis, Cudd distinguished oppression 
from class exploitation and, in doing so, supplied an important foundation for the 
present typology.
Cudd's (2006) conceptualization of degradation and humiliation was compatible 
with the social group-based theory of animalistic dehumanization of Haslam (2006, 
2013).
Mechanistic Dehumanization
Haslam (2006) defined animalistic dehumanization as taking place when one social 
group persistently treats another social group as not having the same uniquely human 
attributes. However, Haslam's theorization of mechanistic dehumanization was not 
social group-based. Just as Cudd's (2006) distinction between oppression and 
exploitation identified the first two legs of the stool of this theory, Haslam's 
(2006) and Kronfelder's (2016) approaches to dehumanization support the third leg.
Haslam delineated two types of dehumanization, one of which (mechanistic 
dehumanization) is here deemed conceptually distinct from both oppression and
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exploitation (Haslam 2006; Haslam and Loughnan 2014). Whereas animalistic 
dehumanization and oppression treat distinct social groups as subhuman, mechan­
istic dehumanization involves the treatment of others as nonhuman or even as non­
living, and as not having the core features of human nature.
However, caution must go with the use of the phrase human nature. Kronfeldner 
(2018: 2) stressed: “As avernacularconcept, talkabout‘humannature'leads to ethically
unjustified dehumanization of people that are considered as being not fully human......”
According to Haslam (2006), mechanistic dehumanization involved viewing groups or 
individuals as automata. For Haslam, mechanistic dehumanization can exist indepen- 
dent of two aspects of social group-based oppression: the implicit disdain of one social 
group for another and the explicit engagement in social group-based conflict.
The empirical extent to which mechanistic dehumanization is not a feature of 
intergroup relations is an empirical question. Haslam's (2006) social psychological 
account was partially rooted in accounts of noninstitutionalized interpersonal rela- 
tions. Since those relations may not be systematic, that part of Haslam's theory is not 
relevant to the present theory. Only institutionalized expressions of mechanistic 
dehumanization are part of this typology.
As used here, mechanistic dehumanization need not be rooted in any particular 
social group status on the part of either those exercising or receiving the dehumaniz­
ing practices involved. Mechanistic dehumanization involves the application to 
people of processes of “standardization, instrumental efficiency, impersonal tech- 
nique, causal determinism, and enforced passivity” (Haslam 2006: 260). For Haslam 
(2006: 262), mechanistic dehumanization “involves the objectifying denial of essen- 
tially human attributes to people toward whom the person feels psychologically 
distant and socially unrelated. ”
Haslam and Loughnan (2014: 401) made clear that the process of dehumanization 
is both a “striking violation of our belief in a common humanity” and an abandon- 
ment ofour “enlightenment assumption that we are all essentially one and the same. ” 
Haslam (2006) used a trichotomy of humans, animals, and machines to show how 
dehumanization implicitly and explicitly undermines our human essence. Thus, for 
Haslam, dehumanization was both a process and an outcome.
Freire (1970), however, saw dehumanization only as a by-product of oppression, 
which was seen as more fundamental. Treating dehumanization as an outcome of 
oppression—as was also done by Mikkola (2016)—stresses the dehumanized nature 
of the person who has experienced injustice. Mikkola's thick conceptualization of 
dehumanization does not undermine the present theorization of human injustice. 
Seeing people who have experienced injustice as dehumanized is a powerful rec­
ognition because it cries out for rehumanization (Rediehs 2014). But it is important 
to recognize that there is a systemic process of mechanistic dehumanization, oppres­
sion, and exploitation that produces that dehumanized state. This theory of human 
injustice suggests that the nature of human injustice is a state of wrongfully unmet 
needs that without intervention will produce serious harm and significantly impaired 
social participation.
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As used here, mechanistic dehumanization is a social system of theoretical impor­
tance. Kronfeldner (2016) drew on Haslam's theory of dehumanization and its 
distinction between mechanistic dehumanization (treating people as nonhuman or 
as nonliving) and animalistic dehumanization (treating social groups as less than 
human). Kronfeldner (2016: 4) showed how dehumanization classifies people in 
inclusive or exclusive ways with respect to various views of human nature, including 
being fully human or being “‘not human' or ‘less human. '”
Kronfeldner (2016: 3) said that dehumanization involved three things: implicit 
processes such as the holding of beliefs toward an out-group, a resulting prejudice 
toward the out-group, and a set of explicit behavioral consequences at the individual, 
organizational, and societal levels. Kronfeldner's theory incorporated group-based 
theory of oppression into the theorization of dehumanization. In that respect, it was 
not conceptually distinct from oppression for the purposes of this typology. How­
ever, Haslam's (2006) recognition that dehumanization produces injustice is con­
sistent with this theory of human injustice.
Continued progress in the theorization of dehumanization is underway (Bain, 
Vaes, and Leyens 2013). This will further identify specific mechanisms including 
a spectrum of objectification (Rector 2014). Work has already been done on desen- 
sitization, namely our progressively less sensitive emotional response to the pain and 
suffering of others (Grossman 2009; Grossman and DeGaetano 2014). Dehumaniza- 
tion may also involve denaturization—the systematic and enforced separation of 
humanity from the natural environment.
Already, Szasz (1970) has shown how medicalization, criminalization, and other 
dehumanizing approaches to social problems are used by the therapeutic state (Gam- 
brill 2014). Patients as well as workers are dehumanized within some human service 
organizations (Rader 2008). Montagu and Matson (1983) connected dehumanization 
to large-scale social processes such as industrialization, compulsive obedience, 
mechanized behavior, and the effects of the scientific revolution. For one historical 
example relevant to mechanistic dehumanization, Ku€hl (2016) examined the orga­
nizational imperatives of supervisors within German organizations that carried out 
the holocaust.
In another example, Ritzer (2019: 6) noted that so irrational is the supposedly 
rationalized nature of McDonaldization, that it produces inefficiency in the name of 
efficiency, a feigned friendliness that ultimately represents falsity in human rela­
tions, pervasive disenchantment, and risks to the human need for a safe and healthy 
work and physical environment. This dehumanizes both workers and customers. 
According to Dolgon (2018: 58), Ritzer's theory demonstrated how the irrational 
nature of what appears to be rationality ends up denying our basic humanity.
Bauman (1991) discussed how dehumanizing organizational processes were 
characteristic of the holocaust, Hiroshima and the Gulag and are still relevant today 
(p. 144): “The organization's answer to the autonomy of moral behaviour is the 
heteronomy of instrumental and procedural rationalities, ” with heteronomy seen as 
an individual level state devoid of moral autonomy. In such a diminished agentic
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state (Bauman 1991: 162), “... the actor is fully tuned to the situation as defined and 
monitored by the superior authority ...... ”
In Modernity and the Holocaust, Bauman (2000: 103) further specified: 
“Dehumanization is inextricably related to the most essential, rationalizing tendency 
of modern bureaucracy. ” From soldiers to corporate officials to human service 
personnel, Bauman (2000) suggested that bureaucratic goals and their attendant 
routines produce an ethical indifference to the moral demands of human beings. 
Dehumanization treats human as objects devoid of any claim to justice. The sys­
tematic study of mechanistic dehumanization can contribute to our epistemological 
effort at denaturalization—the process of recognizing that the world is not the way it 
is because it is natural for it to be this way. This can lead to an antinecessitarian 
critique of society (Unger 1987), by which is meant understanding what Bauman 
called (2000) “the gap between the necessary and the real. ”
A full historical account or the presentation of detailed examples is beyond the 
scope of this article. But there is reason to believe that mechanistic dehumanization 
has long been a characteristic feature of developed civilizations. Seen dialectically, 
just as modern technologies such as the computer and the machine have had both 
liberating and dehumanizing characteristics, the abacus served the pharaohs well. 
The branding and tattooing of slaves has been well established in antiquity and has 
been traced to the origin of the concept of stigma (Jones 1987). More recently, 
according to Herf (1984), modern technological dehumanization has produced both 
reactionary critiques—including those used to justify totalitarian dictatorship under 
the Nazi regime—and Marxist analysis, such as the view of Bukharin that technol­
ogy can become an autonomous social force (Lukacs 1972).
Summary
Before going ahead, I must ask: Is there a fourth such system? Over nearly a decade 
of careful consideration and extensive consultation, I have been unable to identify a 
fourth systemic source of human injustice that meets three requirements: (1) it is 
conceptualized at a similar level of abstraction, (2) it is not significantly similar to 
oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, or exploitation, and (3) it is not merely a 
social mechanism stemming from these three social systems. Systematic poverty 
(Bak and Larsen 2015) does not qualify, since being in poverty is one case of 
wrongfully unmet needs. One such candidate—social inequality—is a social process 
that stems from human injustice, not a fourth unjust social system.
A Needs-Based Partial Theory of Human Injustice
In this section, I parse the theory sentence into numbered parts. Following an 
explanation of column 1 of Figure 1, I discuss each of the key italicized concepts 
of the theory sentence:
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This (1) needs-based theory of the systemic sources, social mechanisms, and 
nature of (2) human injustice contends that (3) three distinct social systemic 
sources--oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation--produce (4) 
unique and/or overlapping social mechanisms, which (5) create systematic inequal­
ity in opportunities to address (6) universal human needs in culturally specific ways, 
leading to (7) the nature of the human injustice theorized here: (8) wrongfully unmet 
needs and the (9) resulting serious harm.
Explanation of Column 1 of Figure 1
Figure 1 illustrates the needs-based theory of human injustice and a typology of 
human injustice, basic human need satisfaction, and human liberation. Column 1 has 
four sections: (A) the sources of social injustice, (B) the mechanisms of human 
injustice, (C) the first part of the nature of human injustice, a state of resultant 
wrongfully unmet needs, and (D) the other aspect of the nature of human injustice: 
serious harm and significantly impaired social participation.
Box A illustrates the existence of one or more necessary (but not sufficient) 
conditions for human injustice, namely a system of oppression, exploitation, or 
mechanistic dehumanization. Box B of column 1 shows how oppression, mechan­
istic dehumanization, and exploitation can singly or jointly produce systematic 
inequality in opportunities to access culturally specific need satisfiers due to unique 
and/or overlapping social mechanisms of one or more of these unjust social systems. 
Box C illustrates how a combination of the direct effects of systematically unequal 
opportunities and the effect of that inequality on the adequacy of intermediate need 
satisfaction can produce a state of wrongfully unmet need.
To constitute human injustice, wrongfully unmet needs (column 1, box C) must 
be resultant from the sources and mechanisms of human injustice. Only then are they 
wrongfully unmet needs, as opposed to needs which are unmet for any number of 
reasons. Determining which specific mix of levels of various intermediate need 
satisfaction and which specific degree of systematic inequality of access to the 
available need satisfiers produce what specific degree of wrongfully unmet needs 
is an empirical question, not a theoretical question. Also, as discussed in more detail 
below, preventive social interventions, rooted in human rights enforcement, can 
prevent the advent of wrongfully unmet needs, meet them once unmet, or reverse 
their harmful effect.
Deci and Ryan (2002) theorized that when basic psychological needs for auton­
omy, competency, and relatedness are not met, there is not only psychological harm 
such as anxiety and depression but heightened morbidity and mortality (Williams 
2002). Ryan and Deci (2017) recently concluded that a critical question for psychol- 
ogy is what set of internal or external conditions allow human flourishing and 
prevent serious harm, such as ill health and failure to thrive. Doyal and Gough 
(1991) said suboptimal levels of physical health and/or suboptimal levels of auton- 
omy of agency produce unmet need. SDT stressed unmet psychological needs. The
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concept of role stress (Doyal and Gough 1991) is consistent with lack of autonomy 
and is an element of wrongfully unmet need.
At the individual level of analysis, further portrayed in box D, such a state leads to 
a strong likelihood of serious harm. Doyal and Gough (1991) saw unmet need as 
leading to mental illness, cognitive deprivation, and role stress, all of which can 
impair participation. This is consistent with the role of restricted opportunities in 
directly producing restricted participation (Doyal and Gough 1991: 171-87). Fraser 
(2009) has also stressed that institutionalized barriers to participation are central to 
injustice. As illustrated in box D, column 1, human injustice involves significantly 
impaired social participation, as opposed to minimally impaired social participation, 
which column 2 shows is enabled by basic needs satisfaction.
In the next section, I explain the sources of human injustice, the mechanisms of 
human injustice, and the nature of human injustice. Subsections 1-3 concern the 
sources of human injustice, 4-7 the mechanisms of human injustice, and 8 and 9 
the nature of human injustice. The numbers and italicized words are from the 
parsed theory sentence introduced earlier and are part of the craft of theorizing 
employed here.
The Sources of Human Injustice
(1) Needs-based theory: Giving primacy of place to human needs is important for 
understanding human injustice. Doyal and Gough (1991) and others have recognized 
that theories of social justice need more than an implicit conception of human need; 
they require a clear theory of need (Reader 2005; Wiggins 1998, [1987] 1998, 
2005). O'Neill's (1998) deontological needs-based approach—which explored the 
relationship between human needs and human rights—also suggested the value of 
considering human moral obligations to meet the needs of others. Reader and 
Brock (2004: 263) concluded that “needs must be central” and called for a 
needs-based approach. Noonan (2006) also contended that needs-based concepts 
are central to moral philosophy and ethics and to a needs-based reconceptualiza­
tion of democracy.
Reader (2007) later developed a needs-based theory of ethical practice, which 
was designed to normatively inform social policies directed to the reality that 
humans are vulnerable beings who universally experience states of unmet (occur- 
rent) need. Reader (2007) reasoned that such states should respond to the moral 
demand to address those needs which are dispositional (unavoidable, essential), 
given our status as human and living beings who strive to both avoid harm and to 
flourish. In a final publication, Reader (2011: 594) contended, “We developed the 
concept of need... to distinguish within our communities the demanding from 
the undemanding, the serious from the less serious, the necessary from the 
unnecessary. ”
Brock (2009) developed a needs-based cosmopolitan theory of global social 
justice, using modified Rawlsian thought experiment methods—supported by
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empirical results from experimental psychology—to arrive at an understanding of 
the preferred and compromise forms of consensus concerning a range of social 
interventions, which were seen as ensuring the minimum tolerable set of income 
and other social protections and entitlements. Brock (2013) later clarified the logical 
structure of coherent statements of need. These included an agent, an end-state goal, 
and instrumental requirements. Brock concluded that fundamental human existence 
needs have a normative force which justifies placing defensible claims on others. 
The present article conceptualizes injustice in a way which gives a stronger moral 
and political force to objections to wrongfully unmet needs.
(2) Human injustice: Using a needs-based approach to human injustice enhances 
the theory's normative significance and differentiates the theory within the larger 
body of theory of social injustice. This article is the first formal theoretical use of the 
concept human injustice. Shklar (1990) used the concept once, without defining it in 
relation to injustice generally. Brooks (1999) used the concept to attribute to human 
beings a litany of examples of injustice, seen in terms of violations of human rights. 
The concept has also been employed in work on human environmental domination 
of nature (Wenz 1996).
No earlier theory has bridged human injustice, human need, human rights, and 
human liberation. However, previous theory has differentiated human needs, human 
rights, and human liberation (Dean 2015; Doyal and Gough 1991; Gil 2004; Ife 
2013; Noonan 2006; Young 1990), human needs and social injustice (Dorling 2010; 
Gil 1998a; Seidler 1986; Shklar 1990), and human needs and inequality (Temkin 
1993; Tilly 1998).
(3) Three distinct social systemic sources: This discussion is brief, given the 
typology presented above. Since this is not a deterministic theory, the social forces 
produced by the social systems of human injustice do not function in isolation from 
the existing universal preconditions outlined in column 2 or the systems of human 
rights outlined in column 3. There is, in a sense, a competitive relationship between 
unjust social systems that constrain opportunities for need satisfaction and systems 
of human rights that enable such opportunities. To believe otherwise would not only 
be deterministic but would be defeatist. And the people united will never be defeated 
(Rzewski [1975] 1990).
The Mechanisms of Human Injustice
(4) Unique and/or overlapping social mechanisms: Elster (2007) noted that in order 
to explain social behavior in nondeterministic ways, we rely upon the explication of 
plausible social mechanisms. By a social mechanism, Elster (2007) meant a demon- 
strable causal chain of sorts, at a lower level of abstraction than a general law. 
Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998) and Stinchcombe (1991) discussed the value of 
posing an abstract higher level theory, in this case a typology of social systems, and 
then identifying associated social mechanisms and tracing their impact on more 
observable outcome phenomena, in this case systematic inequality and unmet needs
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experienced by individual human beings. Progress in social science, Hedstrom and 
Swedberg (1998) contended, often involves such efforts to identify mechanisms (M) 
which generate an outcome (O). In this theory, M consists of the unique and over­
lapping (but only partially theorized) mechanisms, while O stands for the systematic 
inequality in opportunities discussed next.
(5) Systematic inequality in opportunities: Doyal and Gough (1991) stressed that 
what is central for needs theory is inequality of opportunity to address human need, 
not the mere existence of unequal or suboptimal levels of human need satisfaction. 
The present theory emphasizes that unequal outcomes in levels of need satisfaction 
are not necessarily unjust, absent systematically unequal opportunities. Mere 
inequality in access to opportunities to address needs is not necessarily unjust either. 
Only systematically generated inequality—rooted in one of the three theorized 
unjust social systems—leads to human injustice as defined here.
Doyal and Gough (1991: 171) posited a direct role for restricted opportunities, 
independent of lack of autonomy of agency, in producing unmet need. Logically, 
such unjust barriers may prevent the exercise of autonomy. Doyal and Gough (1991) 
parsed restricted opportunities into role deprivation and role stress. Role deprivation 
is relevant to systematic inequality of opportunity. Role stress is relevant to the state 
of wrongfully unmet need discussed further below.
(6) Universal human needs in culturally specific ways: THN and SDT both view 
human needs as universal, but as met in culturally specific manners. Ryan and Sapp 
(2007) noted that both theories posit an objective basis for needs, and that those 
needs are universal across cultures, although addressed differently. Maslow (1943) 
long ago recognized that human needs are both universal and addressed in culturally 
specific ways. As Sayer (1997) has noted, the concern should not be whether theories 
of sameness should be attempted, but whether they are well reasoned and can be 
empirically supported. This theory of human injustice contends that we must engage 
in systematic analysis of within-social-group and between-social-group similarities 
and differences about the sources, mechanisms, and nature of human injustice.
The Nature of Human Injustice
(7) Nature of human injustice: Human injustice involves a state of wrongfully unmet 
need that leads to serious harm and significantly impaired social participation. This 
individual level of human injustice must be resultant from the role of oppression, 
mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation in producing systematic inequality of 
opportunities to address human needs, and not from nonsystemic acts of individual 
injustice. Other theories have also contended that denial of access to the means to satisfy 
human need is at the core of injustice (Gil 1998b, 2004; Noonan 2006; Olson 2007), but 
this has not been formally theorized. The following sections on wrongfully unmet needs 
and serious harm further discuss two aspects of the nature of human injustice.
(8) Wrongfully unmet needs: Wrongfully unmet human needs at the individual 
level are a key element of the nature of human injustice. The three systemic sources
Dover 25
of human injustice are unjust, according to my typology. Wrongfully unmet needs 
are wrongful because they result from the sources and mechanisms of human injus­
tice as theorized, and for no other reason relevant to this theory. More substantively, 
however, they are wrongfully unmet because they are unmet due to systematically 
unequal opportunities for need satisfaction (Noonan 2004, 2006).
The resulting need deprivation is therefore wrongful. Support for such an 
approach to wrongfully unmet needs can be found in the work of Shklar (1990), 
who was concerned that the use of theories of distributive justice often resulted in 
lack of specificity about what was distributed and how that was or was not wrongful. 
Similarly, Temkin (1993) saw inequality as a subset of the more general topics of 
justice and fairness and viewed injustice as more than naturally or randomly occur­
ring unfairness. In such a case, the unmet needs would be wrongfully unmet. Wig­
gins ([1987] 1998) explained that the avoidance of serious harm requires certain 
identifiable necessary conditions which are not circumstantial. This would not 
include need deprivation which takes place due to nonsystemic unfair acts, natural 
disasters, or other reasons which are not inherently unjust (Shklar 1990). Noonan 
(2004, 2006) contended that social theory has underemphasized need deprivation. 
The present theory concurs and states that wrongfully unmet needs are one aspect of 
the nature of human injustice.
(9) Serious harm: Without preventive action being taken, need deprivation pro­
duces serious harm (Doyal and Gough 1991; Noonan 2012; Thomson 2005; Wiggins 
[1987] 1998). It is theoretically valuable to link wrongfully unmet human need to 
serious harm. Miller (2012b) stressed the centrality of serious harm. Wiggins ([1987] 
1998: 43) reasoned it this way: A need is something that one absolutely must have 
instrumental access to in order to avoid being harmed, and therefore “it is pro tanto 
unjust if, among vital interests actually affected by such [social] interventions, the 
greater strictly vital need of anyone is sacrificed in the name of the lesser interests of 
however many others. ” Likewise, McMurtry (1998) criticized classical and contem­
porary economics and proposed a concept of need associated with the deprivation of 
conditions that reduce human organic capability. For McMurtry (1998: 164), “N is a 
need if and only if, and to the extent that, deprivation of N always leads to a 
reduction of organic capability, ” by which was meant “the agent's organic abilities 
to move, think and feel. ”
Conclusions
This theory of human injustice has implications for social theory, social research, 
and social activism.
Implications for Social Theory
The most importance implication of this theory is to recognize the moral and polit­
ical responsibility to end the sources of human injustice and to prevent the
26 Humanity & Society XX(X)
progression of its harmful effects. Short of ending oppression, exploitation, and 
mechanistic dehumanization, which would by the tenets of this theory end human 
injustice, prevention of the effects of injustice can still take place. However, pre­
vention of the effects of human injustice would not end human injustice, for reasons 
I explain next. In doing so, I draw on a new vocabulary of prevention which visua­
lized primary prevention as upstream, secondary prevention as midstream, and 
tertiary prevention as downstream (Gough 2013).
Even if efforts to enforce human rights and other forms of “upstream” primary 
prevention efforts have prevented oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and 
exploitation from producing systemic inequality in opportunities to address human 
need, human injustice would still exist. Even if “midstream” (secondary preven­
tion) efforts have compensated for wrongfully unmet needs and prevented serious 
harm, human injustice would exist. Even if “downstream” (tertiary prevention) 
efforts have reversed the impact of serious harm and restored at least minimally 
impaired social participation, human injustice would still exist. Understanding 
these three key intervention points for preventing the progression of human injus­
tice is important theoretically, empirically, and politically. But so is understanding 
that even the best designed system of prevention at various levels would not mean 
there was no human injustice.
This is because until humankind has achieved human liberation, human injustice 
will exist. It is important to understand that even if some combination of preventive 
social policies and collective resistance have succeeded in guaranteeing basic human 
need satisfaction, this does not ensure human liberation. Human liberation requires 
what the THN refers to as “critical autonomy” (Doyal and Gough 1991) and what 
SDT (Deci and Ryan 2002: 20) refers to as “self-determined behavior. ”
This would hardly be a normative and humanistic theory of human injustice if 
there was not a vision for human liberation. Whether it would be possible to 
achieve human liberation without ending all forms of oppression, exploitation, 
and mechanistic dehumanization is a counterfactual of the future which this theory 
cannot address. Whether some degree of human liberation could exist following a 
combination of preventive social interventions and robust human rights enforce- 
ment—despite the continued existence of one or more social systems of injustice— 
is an empirical question. This theory is valuable due to how it enables asking such 
questions. In doing so, this theory contributes to normative social theory and to 
sociological theory.
Implications for Social Research
Empirical research based on this theory might ask several questions. At the individ­
ual level—and among individuals, groups, communities, and social groups—how is 
human injustice experienced? Is it experienced via everyday acts of oppression, 
mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation, such as microaggressions and macro­
aggressions (Dover 2016c)? How systematically unequal are opportunities to access
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satisfiers of human need? What is the mix of various kinds of wrongfully unmet 
needs? What is the specific nature of the serious harm?
This theory provides a framework for addressing important social questions with 
research implications. For instance, can humanity survive and flourish in a sustain­
able manner (O'Neill et al. 2018)? If so, what kinds of social structure can address 
human needs in a manner sustainable across generations, given global climate 
change (Gough 2015, 2017)? These are not new questions.
Here, a competing theses approach is valuable (Platt 1964). On the one hand, 
Gough (2000) earlier expressed hope that well-designed welfare states might con­
ceivably address basic human needs within the context of a well-regulated contem­
porary capitalism. On the other hand, Lynd (1939: 220) suggested that capitalism 
“probably cannot be made to operate, to assure the amounts of general welfare to 
which the present stage of our technological skills and intelligence entitle us. ” 
Noonan (2006) concluded that an expansively considered state of human need 
satisfaction cannot be met without fundamentally challenging property rights. 
Katz-Fishman, Scott, and Destine (2016) contended that given projections for a 
growing population of dispossessed people—a new precariate class excluded by 
job-eliminating technologies from the means to meet human needs—not only 
short-term demands on the state but fundamentally revolutionary change will be 
required in order to address human need. Efforts to determine the preponderance of 
evidence for these competing theses must “resist the premature closing-off of the 
world from further practical action or reflection” and entertain theories that are 
contrary to orthodoxy (D. L. Harvey 1990: 5).
There is also a need for class, organizational, and institutional analyses of the 
nature of mechanistic dehumanization at the systemic, mechanistic, and individual 
levels. Can class analysis show how “machinery put to wrong use” can transform 
people into “a part of a detail machine” (Marx [1867] 1967: Vol. 1, 422)? Does the 
statement, “The instrument of labor strikes down the labourer, ” require further 
empirical examination (Marx [1867] 1967: Vol. 1, 432)? Can organizational analysis 
of our society of large organizations (Perrow 2002) shed light on possibly unanti­
cipated and dehumanizing consequences of bureaucracy and other organizational 
practices (Baehr 2001; Merton 1936; Weber et al. 2002)? At the level of social 
mechanisms, have exploitation and oppression not only produced systematic 
inequality in addressing our material needs, but also undermined the intimacy, 
identity, and dignity needs which characterize our species (Paige 1993)?
Wrongfully unmet needs are an objective consequence of human injustice. This 
demands research over the life course of individuals, within and between social 
groups, across entire populations, and among societies via historical comparative 
research. Similarly, research can study progress toward human liberation by evalu­
ating the extent of need satisfaction within and between societies which vary in their 
social structural arrangements. Such research can show the conditions necessary for 
overcoming barriers to human flourishing and liberation.
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Implications for Social Activism
Just as the dual-systems theory debate involved fundamental questions for a praxis 
that could inform social activism, this theory's identification of three unjust social 
systems has such implications. Young (1997: 8) criticized Fraser for positing the 
“existence of two ‘systems' of oppression—namely capitalism and patriarchy. ” 
Fraser proposed analyses of both the domestic sphere and the state sphere, and 
suggested both have a structural and an interpretive dimension (Fraser 
1989b: 141-42, fn. 34). Fraser (1989b: 139, fn. 7) contended, “There are not, in fact, 
two distinct systems but, rather, two thoroughly interfused dimensions of a single 
social formation. ” Fraser defended the value for praxis of such an analysis. Young 
(1997: 149) replied that Fraser's approach would hinder “coalitions of resistance to 
dominant economic and political forces. ” However, according to the ultimate logic 
of both approaches, although multiple sources of injustice might work as a single 
integrated system, the origins and operations of social injustice involve more than 
one social system of injustice.
Collins (2015: 4) recognized that two or more “structural forms of power” can 
coexist and eschewed single-axis thinking (Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013). This 
suggests that there is value for praxis in how the present approach to human injustice 
has distinguished among three systemic sources of human injustice.
There is historical support for the value of such an approach. As Charno noted in 
Neoliberal Apartheid (Clarno 2017), the leadership of the South African struggle 
adopted a two-stage theory which distinguished between apartheid—a system of 
oppression as theorized here—and capitalism—a system of exploitation. Charno 
(2017) named “racial capitalism” as an analytical perspective which might have 
informed a strategy to confront apartheid and capitalism simultaneously. The tri- 
partite coalition alliance—the African National Congress, the South African Com- 
munist Party, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions—made a strategic 
decision to focus on ending apartheid and to postpone efforts to end capitalist 
exploitation (Maharaj et al. 2014; O'Malley 2007).
Influencing this collective decision was theoretical attention to three sources 
of injustice: the oppression which apartheid represented, South African mono­
poly capitalism, and the persistence of both capitalist and socialist economic 
alienation (Slovo 1990). Slovo (1990) presented a three-system analysis and a 
three-stage strategy. First, there would be a national democratic revolution 
designed to end apartheid, set up electoral democracy, and institute constitu­
tionally prescribed human rights. Next, there would be a global struggle for 
democratic socialism that could eventually end economic exploitation. Only in 
a third stage would communism bring with it the elimination of all forms of 
alienation. In South Africa, at an important historical point, a three-system 
analysis of the barriers to human liberation was of tactical and strategic impor­
tance to struggles against social injustice.
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As we forge a praxis that can inform struggles against social injustice today and 
tomorrow, it is important to recognize that economic exploitation and group- 
based oppression are not the only sources of human injustice. Mechanistic dehu­
manization is also an important source of human injustice, and it can also produce 
the impetus for significant social change. For instance, Ritzer (2019: 201) noted 
that dehumanization can produce mass resistance, since “being locked in such a 
cage is apt to be infuriating to most people. ” As Paige (1993: 12) stressed, injus­
tice related to the denial of basic human needs can produce “movements of 
resistance that can lead to fundamental changes in capitalism. ” As Renault 
(2017) has noted, in Spain Podemos has made the political critique of social 
suffering the foundation of its movement.
Theories of human injustice, human need, and human liberation can fuel social 
struggles that are both normatively linked to recognized moral consensus and are 
progressively pragmatic (Unger 2005, 2007, 2009). Furthermore, needs-based 
social theory such as this partial theory of human injustice can help “focus atten­
tion on the vexed dynamics of difference and the solidarities of sameness in the 
context of antidiscrimination and social movement politics” (Cho et al. 
2013: 788). One example of that was the widespread appearance of the slogan 
“Human Needs, Not Corporate Greed” during the Occupy Movement in the 
United States in Fall 2011.
Final Conclusions
This needs-based partial theory of human injustice draws on theories of human need 
that stress absolute biological (existence) needs, welfare needs (basic needs of the 
kind required for avoidance of serious harm), and those perfectionist needs required 
to flourish (McLeod 2014). I have argued that it is unjust to allow systematic 
inequality in opportunities to address each of these forms of human need: to survive, 
to avoid serious harm, and to flourish.
People do not live by bread alone. For the human liberation we value, we need to 
be able to dance and to daven, as well as to toil for our daily bread. As Rose 
Schneiderman said in 1912 (Eisenstein 1983: 32), “The worker must have bread, but 
she must have roses, too. ” Such struggles for human liberation are rooted in our most 
fundamental needs and our fondest desires. Our struggle is to eventually end oppres- 
sion, mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation. In the meantime, to survive, we 
must enforce human rights than can constrain human injustice. But we must never 
forget our goal of human liberation.
To build such a world demands the elimination of systems of oppression, 
mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation. This needs-based partial theory 
of human injustice contributes to a normative social science about what it is that 
we are fighting against and what it is that we are striving for. It does so by stressing 
the primacy of needs for our analysis of human injustice and for our vision of 
human liberation. Needs-based theory of human injustice can help ensure that we
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root our theory, research, and activism in the everyday reality of the human con­
dition. This can help ensure we are not beholden to ideologies and theologies that 
do not prioritize preventing human injustice, meeting human needs, and striving 
for human liberation.
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